Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate /
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictio...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
c2006
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006 Washington, D.C. : 2006 |
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/256 IMF eLibrary IMF working paper ; WP/06/256 |
| Subjects: |
Internet
This item is not available through BorrowDirect. Please contact your institution’s interlibrary loan office for further assistance.Massachusetts Institute of Technology
| Call Number: |
HG3810.I45 no.WP/06/256 |
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