Banks’ Precautionary Capital and Persistent Credit Crunches /
Periods of banking distress are often followed by sizable and long-lasting contractions in bank credit. They may be explained by a declined demand by financially impaired borrowers (the conventional financial accelerator) or by lower supply by capital-constrained banks, a "credit crunch"....
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2008
|
| Edition: | 1st ed |
| Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/08/248 IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/248 |
| Subjects: |
| LEADER | 04741nam a22008654i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 6c4d1d78-1780-4c35-b420-8c28ed5d55e2 | ||
| 005 | 20240728000000.0 | ||
| 008 | 020129s2008 dcu o i00 0 eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 1-282-84199-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 1-4518-7106-6 | ||
| 020 | |a 1-4527-4907-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 1-4623-5881-0 | ||
| 020 | |a 9786612841996 | ||
| 035 | |a (CKB)3170000000055144 | ||
| 035 | |a (EBL)1608063 | ||
| 035 | |a (EXLCZ)993170000000055144 | ||
| 035 | |a (IMF)WPIEE2008248 | ||
| 035 | |a (MiAaPQ)EBC1608063 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)874177680 | ||
| 035 | |a (PQKB)10948551 | ||
| 035 | |a (PQKBManifestationID)11612509 | ||
| 035 | |a (PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943980 | ||
| 035 | |a (PQKBWorkID)10982471 | ||
| 035 | |a (SSID)ssj0000943980 | ||
| 040 | |a DcWaIMF |b eng |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 043 | |a n-us--- | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HB3722 |b .V354 2007 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 330.973 |2 23 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Valencia, Fabian | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Banks’ Precautionary Capital and Persistent Credit Crunches / |c Fabian Valencia |
| 250 | |a 1st ed | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C. : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (37 p.) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr | ||
| 440 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/08/248 | |
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF Working Papers | |
| 500 | |a Description based upon print version of record | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Contents; I. Introduction; II. Banks and the Real Economy; III. The Model; A. The Loan Contract; B. The Bank's Optimization Problem; C. Solution; D. Risk and the Target Level of Solvency; IV. Quantitative Experiments; V. Bank Recapitalization; VI. Conclusions; Figures; 1. Bank Credit as Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries; 2. Optimal Policy Functions; 3. Target Level of Solvency; 4. Responses to a Negative Transitory Productivity Shock; 5. Responses to an Interest Rate Increase; 6. Responses to a Large Negative Shock, With and Without Recapitalization | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7. Credit Crunch Severity and Bank Recapitalization Tables; 1. Bank's Sequence of Events; 2. Public Recapitalization Costs for Selected Crises Episodes; 3. Sensitivity Analysis to a 2-σ Productivity Shock; 4. Bank's Solvency Regions; Appendix; 8. Deposit Interest Rate; References | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Periods of banking distress are often followed by sizable and long-lasting contractions in bank credit. They may be explained by a declined demand by financially impaired borrowers (the conventional financial accelerator) or by lower supply by capital-constrained banks, a "credit crunch". This paper develops a bank model to study credit crunches and their real effects. In this model, banks maintain a precautionary level of capital that serves as a smoothing mechanism to avert disruptions in the supply of credit when hit by small shocks. However, for larger shocks, highly persistent credit crunches may arise even when the impulse is a one time, non-serially correlated event. From a policy perspective, the model justifies the use of public funds to recapitalize banks following a significant deterioration in their capital position | |
| 546 | |a English | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF front page (ebrary, viewed February 26, 2014) | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Bank capital |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Bank failures |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Credit |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Financial crises |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Risk |z United States |x Econometric models | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bank credit |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banking |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bankruptcy |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and Banking |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Credit |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Debt |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Depository Institutions |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Finance |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Finance: General |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Industries: Financial Services |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Liquidation |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Loans |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Micro Finance Institutions |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Monetary economics |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Money and Monetary Policy |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Mortgages |2 imf | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Solvency |2 imf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a United States |2 imf | |
| 776 | |z 1-4519-1559-4 | ||
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; |v No. 2008/248 | |
| 999 | 1 | 0 | |i 6c4d1d78-1780-4c35-b420-8c28ed5d55e2 |l 99119250183408501 |s US-NCD |m banks’_precautionary_capital_and_persistent_credit_crunches________________2008____1__intera________________________________________valencia__fabian___________________e |