How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers
Main Author: | Belli, Paolo |
---|---|
Corporate Author: | World Bank Development Research Group. Public Economics |
Format: | Electronic Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics,
2001
|
Series: | Policy research working papers ;
2574 World Bank e-Library |
Subjects: |
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