Cambridge pragmatism : from Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittegenstein /
Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of prag...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2016
Oxford, United Kingdom : 2016 |
| Edition: | First Edition |
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Cambridge Massachusetts. Peirce
- James
- Bridges across the Atlantic
- Cambridge England. The anti-pragmatism of pre-war Cambridge
- The pull of pragmatism on Russell
- Ramsey
- Wittgenstein : post-Tractatus
- Part I Cambridge Massachusetts
- 1 Peirce 11
- 1.1 Introduction 11
- 1.2 The Pragmatic Maxim: Meaning, Use, Practice 12
- 1.3 Belief and Disposition 17
- 1.4 Truth 23
- 1.5 Experience: Mathematics, Metaphysics, Religion, and Morals 31
- 1.6 Logic and Probability 39
- 1.7 Regulative Assumptions and the Principle of Bivalence 48
- 2 James 52
- 2.1 Introduction 52
- 2.2 Psychology: Observation and Experience 53
- 2.3 Truth and Usefulness 60
- 2.4 Willing to Believe 63
- 2.5 Religious Experience 67
- 2.6 James on Common Sense 73
- 3 Bridges across the Atlantic 75
- 3.1 F. C. S. Schiller 75
- 3.2 Victoria Welby 82
- 3.3 C. K. Ogden 85
- Part II Cambridge England
- 4 The Anti-Pragmatism of Pre-War Cambridge 91
- 4.1 Introduction 91
- 4.2 The Revolt against Idealism: The Early Moore and Russell on Propositions and Reality 94
- 4.3 Russell's Logical Atomism 98
- 4.4 Russell's Attack on Pragmatism 104
- 4.5 Moore's Contribution 113
- 4.6 The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus 117
- 4.7 Wittgensteins Intersections with the Vienna Circle 128
- 5 The Pull of Pragmatism on Russell 138
- 5.1 Russell at Harvard 138
- 5.2 New Thoughts about Experience, Belief, and Meaning 141
- 5.3 The Analysis of Mind 145
- 6 Ramsey 155
- 6.1 Introduction 155
- 6.2 The Undergraduate Ramsey and the Tractatus 159
- 6.3 The Undergraduate Ramsey's Response to Russell 162
- 6.4 The 1927 Ramsey: Belief, Action, Probability, Truth 166
- 6.5 Philosophy and Meaninglessness 183
- 6.6 'General Propositions and Causality' 189
- 6.7 On Truth 199
- 6.8 Ethics and Pragmatist Naturalism 213
- 6.9 A Step beyond the Redundancy Theory to the Pragmatist Theory of Truth 222
- 7 Wittgenstein: Post-Tractatus 231
- 7.1 Introduction 231
- 7.2 Wittgenstein and Ramsey, 1929 233
- 7.3 Wittgensteins 1929 Pragmatism 238
- 7.4 The Primacy of Practice and Meaning as Use 248
- 7.5 Truth 254
- 7.6 Rule-Following, Privacy, and Behaviour 258
- 7.7 Religion, Ethics, and Forms of Life 264
- 7.8 On Doubt and Certainty 272