Arguments about abortion : personhood, morality, and law /

Does the morality of abortion depend on the moral status of the human fetus? Must the law of abortion presume an answer to the question of when personhood begins? Can a law which permits late abortion but not infanticide be morally justified? These are just some of the questions this book sets out t...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Greasley, Kate (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2017
Oxford, United Kingdom : 2017
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : 2017
Edition:First edition
Subjects:
LEADER 11178nam a2200925 i 4500
001 b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0
005 20240721000000.0
008 161107s2017 enk b 001 0 eng d
010 |a  2016962725 
010 |a 2016962725 
019 |a 971946997  |a 972138705  |a 972141044 
020 |a 0198766785  |q (hardback) 
020 |a 0198766785  |q hardback 
020 |a 0198806604  |q (paperback) 
020 |a 0198806604  |q paperback 
020 |a 9780198766780  |q (hardback) 
020 |a 9780198766780  |q hardback 
020 |a 9780198806608  |q (paperback) 
020 |a 9780198806608  |q paperback 
035 |a (OCoLC)962330767 
035 |a (OCoLC)971970586  |z (OCoLC)962330767  |z (OCoLC)971946997  |z (OCoLC)972138705  |z (OCoLC)972141044 
035 |a (OCoLC)971970586 
035 |a (OCoLC-M)971970586 
035 |a 971970586 
035 |a 9838121 
040 |a DLC  |b eng  |e rda  |c DLC  |d YDX  |d UV0  |d AMH  |d RCJ  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCO  |d CLU 
040 |a ERASA  |b eng  |e rda  |c ERASA  |d BDX  |d BTCTA  |d NhCcYBP 
040 |a YDX  |b eng  |e rda  |c YDX  |d UV0  |d AMH  |d RCJ 
040 |a YDX  |b eng  |e rda  |c YDX  |d UV0  |d NIC 
040 |a YDX  |b eng  |e rda  |c YDX 
042 |a pcc 
049 |a NDLL 
049 |a RCJL 
050 4 |a K5181  |b .G74 2017 
050 4 |a K5181  |b .G74 2017x 
050 4 |a XXK5181  |b .G74 2017 
050 0 0 |a K5181  |b .G74 2017 
082 0 4 |a 342.08/4  |2 23 
090 |a XXK5181  |b .G74 2017 
100 1 |a Greasley, Kate,  |e author  |0 http://viaf.org/viaf/311466472 
100 1 |a Greasley, Kate,  |e author  |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/311466472 
100 1 |a Greasley, Kate,  |e author 
245 1 0 |a Arguments about abortion :  |b personhood, morality, and law /  |c Kate Greasley 
250 |a First edition 
264 |a ©2017 
264 1 |a Oxford ;  |a New York, NY :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2017 
264 1 |a Oxford, United Kingdom :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2017 
264 1 |a Oxford, United Kingdom ;  |a New York, NY :  |b Oxford University Press,  |c 2017 
300 |a ix, 269 pages ;  |c 24 cm 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a unmediated  |b n  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a volume  |b nc  |2 rdacarrier 
500 |a Based on author's doctoral thesis, 2014, Oxford 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 263-266) and index 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages [263]-266) and index 
505 0 |a PART ONE: ORDERING THE ARGUMENT; PART TWO: THE THRESHOLD OF PERSONHOOD; PART THREE: PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM 
505 0 |a What should abortion argument be about? -- Gestation as good samaritanism -- Abortion as justified homicide -- Analogical arguments and sex equality -- Personhood thresholds, arbitrariness, and 'punctualism' -- Dualism, substantial identity, and the precautionary principle -- Gradualism and human embodiment -- Human equality and the significance of birth -- Regulating abortion -- Selective abortion : sex and disability -- Matters of conscience 
505 0 |g I  |t Ordering the Argument -- 1. What should abortion argument be about? -- 2. Gestation as good samaritanism -- 3. Abortion as justified homicide -- 4. Analogical arguments and sex equality --  |g II.  |t The Threshold of Personhood -- 5. Personhood thresholds, arbitrariness, and 'Punctualism' -- 6. Dualism, substantial identity, and the precautionary principle -- 7. Gradualism and human embodiment -- 8. Human equality and the significance of birth --  |g III.  |t Principle and Pragmatism -- 9. Regulating abortion -- 10. Selective abortion: sex and disability -- 11. Matters of conscience. 
505 0 0 |g Introduction --  |t What should abortion argument be about? --  |t Gestation as good Samaritanism --  |t Abortion as justified homicide --  |t Analogical arguments and sex equality --  |t Personhood thresholds, arbitrariness, and 'punctualism' --  |t Dualism, substantial identity, and the precautionary principle --  |t Gradualism and human embodiment --  |t Human equality and the significance of birth --  |t Regulating abortion --  |t Selective abortion : sex and disability --  |t Matters of conscience 
520 |a Does the morality of abortion depend on the moral status of the human fetus? Must the law of abortion presume an answer to the question of when personhood begins? Can a law which permits late abortion but not infanticide be morally justified? These are just some of the questions this book sets out to address. With an extended analysis of the moral and legal status of abortion, Kate Greasley offers an alternative account to the reputable arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson and instead brings the philosophical notion of 'personhood' to the foreground of this debate. Structured in three parts, the book will (I) consider the relevance of prenatal personhood for the moral and legal evaluation of abortion; (II) trace the key features of the conventional debate about when personhood begins and explore the most prominent issues in abortion ethics literature: the human equality problem and the difference between abortion and infanticide; and (III) examine abortion law and regulation as well as the differing attitudes to selective abortion. The book concludes with a snapshot into the current controversy surrounding the scope of the right to conscientiously object to participation in abortion provision 
520 8 |a Does the morality of abortion depend on the moral status of the human fetus? Must the law of abortion presume an answer to the question of when personhood begins? Can a law which permits late abortion but not infanticide be morally justified? These are just some of the questions this book sets out to address. With an extended analysis of the moral and legal status of abortion, Kate Greasley offers an alternative account to the reputable arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson and instead brings the philosophical notion of 'personhood' to the foreground of this debate. Structured in three parts, the book will (I) consider the relevance of prenatal personhood for the moral and legal evaluation of abortion; (II) trace the key features of the conventional debate about when personhood begins and explore the most prominent issues in abortion ethics literature: the human equality problem and the difference between abortion and infanticide; and (III) examine abortion law and regulation as well as the differing attitudes to selective abortion. 0The book concludes with a snapshot into the current controversy surrounding the scope of the right to conscientiously object to participation in abortion provision 
520 8 |a Does the morality of abortion depend on the moral status of the human fetus? Must the law of abortion presume an answer to the question of when personhood begins? Can a law which permits late abortion but not infanticide be morally justified? These are just some of the questions this book sets out to address. With an extended analysis of the moral and legal status of abortion, Kate Greasley offers an alternative account to the reputable arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson and instead brings the philosophical notion of 'personhood' to the foreground of this debate. Structured in three parts, the book will (I) consider the relevance of prenatal personhood for the moral and legal evaluation of abortion; (II) trace the key features of the conventional debate about when personhood begins and explore the most prominent issues in abortion ethics literature: the human equality problem and the difference between abortion and infanticide; and (III) examine abortion law and regulation as well as the differing attitudes to selective abortion. The book concludes with a snapshot into the current controversy surrounding the scope of the right to conscientiously object to participation in abortion provision --Flap of cover 
520 8 |a Does the morality of abortion depend on the moral status of the human fetus? Must the law of abortion presume an answer to the question of when personhood begins? Can a law which permits late abortion but not infanticide be morally justified? These are just some of the questions this book sets out to address. With an extended analysis of the moral and legal status of abortion, Kate Greasley offers an alternative account to the reputable arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson and instead brings the philosophical notion of 'personhood' to the foreground of this debate. Structured in three parts, the book will (I) consider the relevance of prenatal personhood for the moral and legal evaluation of abortion; (II) trace the key features of the conventional debate about when personhood begins and explore the most prominent issues in abortion ethics literature: the human equality problem and the difference between abortion and infanticide; and (III) examine abortion law and regulation as well as the differing attitudes to selective abortion. The book concludes with a snapshot into the current controversy surrounding the scope of the right to conscientiously object to participation in abortion provision 
596 |a 24 
650 0 |a Abortion  |x Ethics 
650 0 |a Abortion  |x Law and legislation 
650 0 |a Abortion  |x Moral and ethical aspects 
650 7 |a Abortion  |x Law and legislation  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Abortion  |x Moral and ethical aspects  |2 fast 
730 0 |a University press scholarship online  |5 net 
999 1 0 |i b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0  |l a11873470  |s US-CST  |m arguments_about_abortionpersonhood_morality_and_law________________________2017____1__oxfora________________________________________greasley__kate_____________________p 
999 1 0 |i b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0  |l 10953413  |s US-ICU  |m arguments_about_abortionpersonhood_morality_and_law________________________2017____1__oxfora________________________________________greasley__kate_____________________p 
999 1 0 |i b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0  |l 990149158070203941  |s US-MH  |m arguments_about_abortionpersonhood_morality_and_law________________________2017____1__oxfora________________________________________greasley__kate_____________________p 
999 1 0 |i b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0  |l 008005951  |s US-NCD  |m arguments_about_abortionpersonhood_morality_and_law________________________2017____1__oxfora________________________________________greasley__kate_____________________p 
999 1 0 |i b9868854-802b-4404-99d4-6cef92a6dca0  |l 9838121  |s US-NIC  |m arguments_about_abortionpersonhood_morality_and_law________________________2017____1__oxfora________________________________________greasley__kate_____________________p 
999 1 1 |l a11873470  |s ISIL:US-CST  |t BKS  |a LAW BASEMENT  |b 36105228764218  |c K5181 .G74 2017  |d LC  |x LAW-STKS  |y 36105228764218  |p UNLOANABLE 
999 1 1 |l 10953413  |s ISIL:US-ICU  |t BKS  |a DLL-Law  |b 74485782  |c XXK5181.G74 2017  |d Library of Congress classification  |y 9712005  |p LOANABLE 
999 1 1 |l 990149158070203941  |s ISIL:US-MH  |t BKS  |a LAW TEMPGEN  |b 32044140918061  |c K5181 .G74 2017x  |d 0  |x 01 BOOK  |y 232179614110003941  |p UNLOANABLE 
999 1 1 |l 008005951  |s ISIL:US-NCD  |t BKS  |a LAW LGEN  |b L00618964Y   |c K5181 .G74 2017  |d 0  |x BOOK  |y 008144258  |p LOANABLE 
999 1 1 |l 9838121  |s ISIL:US-NIC  |t BKS  |a law  |b 31924120746635  |c K5181 .G74 2017  |d lc  |k 1  |x Book  |y 3e699cc1-7454-4eeb-a542-4bbcf6a548fd  |p LOANABLE