Sameness and substance renewed /
A substantially revised and expanded edition of David Wiggins? classic work Sameness and Substance
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge, U.K. ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2001
Cambridge, UK : New York : 2001 Cambridge, UK ; New York : 2001 Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : 2001 |
Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- 11. Might it ever be true to say that a was almost b, that a was almost numerically identical with b?
- 12. Conclusion
- 7. Personal identity
- 1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity
- 2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness
- 3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions
- 4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition
- 5. Butler's central insight
- 6. A neo-Lockean conception
- 7. Unfinished business
- 8. The theses to be argued in this chapter
- 9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory
- 10. A second and third question about Parfit's definition of 'Q-remember'
- 11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory
- 12. More about 'dependent in the right way'
- 13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date
- 14. Participation in the growth of knowledge
- ^
- 15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case
- 16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered
- 17. One last variant
- and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts?
- 4. Proposition D further explicated and amplified: and D(ii) as the proper development of D
- 5. Existence and sortal predications
- 6. Further D principles
- 7. Miscellaneous further principles; and a doubt about counting
- 3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of things falling under them
- 1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds
- 2. The other sortal predicates
- 3. Problems of artefact identity
- 4. Two approaches to the problem of artefact identity
- 5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark
- 6. Transition to Chapters Four and Five
- 4. Individuative essentialism
- 1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation
- 2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism
- 3. The necessity of identity and the necessity of difference
- 4. Conceivability, theory and essence
- 5. Conceivability continued
- ^
- 6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences
- 7. That the idea of haecceities' is as misbegotten as the word itself is unlovely
- 8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can'
- 9. Avoiding overspecificity, allowing vagueness
- 10. Other de re necessities, real or putative: a framework for further inquiry
- 11. The essences of artefacts and the matter of artefacts
- 12. One special kind of artefact: works of art and the essences of these
- 5. Conceptualism and realism
- 1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism
- 2. Four clarifications
- 3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence
- 4. A hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism
- 5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and corrected in the light of certain truisms; and the reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun
- 6. The perfect consonance of sober realism and sober conceptualism
- ^
- 7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied
- 8. Concluding suggestions
- 6. Identity: absolute, determinate, and all or nothing, like no other relation but itself
- 1. Three contrasted views of singling out an object
- 2. Back and forth between the object and the thought of the object
- 3. Some putative examples of indeterminate objects
- 4. If object a is the same as object b, then a is determinately the same as b
- 5. What, if anything, follows from such formal derivations?
- 6. Treatment of examples (a), (b), (c); of [actual symbol not reproducible]3
- 7. Sense and point; and sense as the work of the mind
- 8. On the level of reference, things cannot be simply conceived into being or postulated into existence
- not even material things with matter putatively ready at hand
- 9. Once again (one last time) the things to which simple identity sentences make a reference
- 10. More about the relation of identity
- ^
- Preamble, Chiefly concerned with matters methodological and terminological
- 1. The absoluteness of sameness
- 1. A central question about identity: and rival answers given by defenders of the absoluteness of identity and the relativity of identity
- 2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity
- 3. Five ways for it to be false that [superscript a = b] [subscript g]
- 4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity
- 5. Some cases that might be alleged to be of type (5)
- 6. Discussion of type-(4) cases
- 7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law
- 8. A mathematical example supposedly of type (5)
- 9. Conclusion concerning R, the Relativity of Identity
- 10. Absoluteness and sortal dependence jointly affirmed and formalized
- 2. Outline of a theory of individuation
- 1. Proposition D and the rationale of the 'same what?' question
- 2. The charge of circularity, or of emptiness
- 3. The identity of indiscernibles
- ^
- Preamble, Chiefly concerned with matters methodological and terminological
- 1 The absoluteness of sameness
- 1. A central question about identity: and rival answers given by defenders of the absoluteness of identity and the relativity of identity
- 2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity
- 3. Five ways for it to be false that [superscript a = b] [subscript g]
- 4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity
- 5. Some cases that might be alleged to be of type (5)
- 6. Discussion of type-(4) cases
- 7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law
- 8. A mathematical example supposedly of type (5)
- 9. Conclusion concerning R, the Relativity of Identity
- 10. Absoluteness and sortal dependence jointly affirmed and formalized
- 2. Outline of a theory of individuation
- 1. Proposition D and the rationale of the 'same what?' question
- 2. The charge of circularity, or of emptiness
- 3. The identity of indiscernibles
- 4. Proposition D further explicated and amplified: and D(ii) as the proper development of D
- 5. Existence and sortal predications
- 6. Further D principles
- 7. Miscellaneous further principles; and a doubt about counting
- 3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of things falling under them
- 1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds
- 2. The other sortal predicates
- 3. Problems of artefact identity
- 4. Two approaches to the problem of artefact identity
- 5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark
- 6. Transition to Chapters Four and Five
- 4. Individuative essentialism
- 1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation
- 2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism
- 3. The necessity of identity and the necessity of difference
- 4. Conceivability, theory and essence
- 5. Conceivability continued
- 6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences
- 7. That the idea of haecceities' is as misbegotten as the word itself is unlovely
- 8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can'
- 9. Avoiding overspecificity, allowing vagueness
- 10. Other de re necessities, real or putative: a framework for further inquiry
- 11. The essences of artefacts and the matter of artefacts
- 12. One special kind of artefact: works of art and the essences of these
- 5. Conceptualism and realism
- 1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism
- 2. Four clarifications
- 3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence
- 4. A hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism
- 5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and corrected in the light of certain truisms; and the reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun
- 6. The perfect consonance of sober realism and sober conceptualism
- 7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied
- 8. Concluding suggestions
- 6. Identity: absolute, determinate, and all or nothing, like no other relation but itself
- 1. Three contrasted views of singling out an object
- 2. Back and forth between the object and the thought of the object
- 3. Some putative examples of indeterminate objects
- 4. If object a is the same as object b, then a is determinately the same as b
- 5. What, if anything, follows from such formal derivations?
- 6. Treatment of examples (a), (b), (c); of [actual symbol not reproducible]3
- 7. Sense and point; and sense as the work of the mind
- 8. On the level of reference, things cannot be simply conceived into being or postulated into existence - not even material things with matter putatively ready at hand
- 9. Once again (one last time) the things to which simple identity sentences make a reference
- 10. More about the relation of identity
- 11. Might it ever be true to say that a was almost b, that a was almost numerically identical with b?
- 12. Conclusion
- 7. Personal identity
- 1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity
- 2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness
- 3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions
- 4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition
- 5. Butler's central insight
- 6. A neo-Lockean conception
- 7. Unfinished business
- 8. The theses to be argued in this chapter
- 9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory
- 10. A second and third question about Parfit's definition of 'Q-remember'
- 11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory
- 12. More about 'dependent in the right way'
- 13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date
- 14. Participation in the growth of knowledge
- 15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case
- 16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered
- 17. One last variant - and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts?
- Preamble, Chiefly concerned with matters methodological and terminological
- 1 The absoluteness of sameness
- 1. A central question about identity: and rival answers given by defenders of the absoluteness of identity and the relativity of identity
- 2. Leibniz's Law and the difficulties of relative identity
- 3. Five ways for it to be false that [superscript a = b] [subscript g]
- 4. Possible examples of type-(4) relativity
- 5. Some cases that might be alleged to be of type (5)
- 6. Discussion of type-(4) cases
- 7. Discussion of type-(5) cases and some attempted amendments of Leibniz's Law
- 8. A mathematical example supposedly of type (5)
- 9. Conclusion concerning R, the Relativity of Identity
- 10. Absoluteness and sortal dependence jointly affirmed and formalized
- 2. Outline of a theory of individuation
- 1. Proposition D and the rationale of the 'same what?' question
- 2. The charge of circularity, or of emptiness
- 3. The identity of indiscernibles
- 4. Proposition D further explicated and amplified: and D(ii) as the proper development of D
- 5. Existence and sortal predications
- 6. Further D principles
- 7. Miscellaneous further principles; and a doubt about counting
- 3. Sortal concepts: and the characteristic activity or function or purpose of things falling under them
- 1. The sortal predicates of natural kinds
- 2. The other sortal predicates
- 3. Problems of artefact identity
- 4. Two approaches to the problem of artefact identity
- 5. Summary of conclusions to date: and a methodological remark
- 6. Transition to Chapters Four and Five
- 4. Individuative essentialism
- 1. Independence from the explicitly modal of the foregoing theory of individuation
- 2. Principles and maxims governing the derivation of a modest essentialism
- 3. The necessity of identity and the necessity of difference
- 4 Conceivability, theory and essence
- 5. Conceivability continued
- 6. Individuative essentialism and its consequences
- 7. That the idea of haecceities' is as misbegotten as the word itself is unlovely
- 8. The essentialist 'must' and 'can'
- 9. Avoiding overspecificity, allowing vagueness
- 10. Other de re necessities, real or putative: a framework for further inquiry
- 11. The essences of artefacts and the matter of artefacts
- 12. One special kind of artefact: works of art and the essences of these
- 5. Conceptualism and realism
- 1. Anti-realist conceptualism and anti-conceptualist realism
- 2. Four clarifications
- 3. A conventionalist reconstruction of our modal convictions: a conceptualist anti-realist view of essence
- 4. A hypothesis concerning the sources of anti-essentialism
- 5. An exaggeration of conceptualism, deprecated and corrected in the light of certain truisms; and the reply to the anti-conceptualist realist begun
- 6. The perfect consonance of sober realism and sober conceptualism
- 7. The realist requirement restated, refurbished and satisfied
- 8. Concluding suggestions
- 6. Identity: absolute, determinate, and all or nothing, like no other relation but itself
- 1. Three contrasted views of singling out an object
- 2. Back and forth between the object and the thought of the object
- 3. Some putative examples of indeterminate objects
- 4. If object a is the same as object b, then a is determinately the same as b
- 5. What, if anything, follows from such formal derivations?
- 6. Treatment of examples (a), (b), (c); of [actual symbol not reproducible]3
- 7. Sense and point; and sense as the work of the mind
- 8. On the level of reference, things cannot be simply conceived into being or postulated into existence - not even material things with matter putatively ready at hand
- 9 Once again (one last time) the things to which simple identity sentences make a reference
- 10. More about the relation of identity
- 11. Might it ever be true to say that a was almost b, that a was almost numerically identical with b?
- 12. Conclusion
- 7. Personal identity
- 1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity
- 2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness
- 3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions
- 4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition
- 5. Butler's central insight
- 6. A neo-Lockean conception
- 7. Unfinished business
- 8. The theses to be argued in this chapter
- 9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory
- 10. A second and third question about Parfit's definition of 'Q-remember'
- 11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory
- 12. More about 'dependent in the right way'
- 13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date
- 14. Participation in the growth of knowledge
- 15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case
- 16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered
- 17. One last variant - and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts?